

**“Disarmament and development” by Mr. Pascal Boniface,
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The logic of disarmament for the development is registered in the UNO Charter itself of which the article 26[#] sets for mission to the Security Council to support the establishment and the maintenance of peace and international safety by diverting towards the armaments only the minimum of human and economic resources of the world.

In April 1955, at the time of the Conference of the not aligned countries of Bandung, 29 developing countries declared that universal disarmament is a necessity. Soon after this conference, the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France met in Geneva. Edgar Faure, chief of French Government proposed to politically link disarmament to development ends while allocating to the rise in the standard of living of the under developed countries a part of the reductions operated on the military expenditure.

In 1978, at the time of his speech in front of the Extraordinary Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament, the president Valery Giscard d'Estaing proposed in his turn the "creation of a special fund of disarmament for the development" by evoking disproportion between "the one billion dollar devoted each day to the military arsenals" and of the development aid (14 times lower).

In 1983, François Mitterrand suggested in front of the General Assembly of the United Nations to reunite an international conference on the relation between the disarmament and the development.

The concept of disarmament for the development is founded on the idea of a choice between "the butter or the cannons" ("le beurre ou les canons") The military expenditure being generally analysed like unproductive expenditure (and thus, like a waste). Their reduction seems necessarily in favour of the growth of the world economy. The disarmament, represented by the reduction of the military expenditure, fully constitutes an instrument of development.

Before does disappear the East/West division, there were however differences of opinion on this topic between the eastern and the southern countries as well as within the western countries.

For some of these countries, there was a direct relation between disarmament and development. Disarmament was considered as the principal way of new incomes to ensure the needs of the development. Only the first one could made it possible to implement the second one. The Western countries refuted this binary relation and prioritised a triangular relation safety - disarmament - development.

A conference on the disarmament and the development was taken place in New York in 1987 in the absence, however, of the United States.

The Eastern countries and certain countries of the South called the responsibility of the Western countries in stockpiling of weapons into question as well as the underdevelopment. The Western countries put forward the absence of transparency on the military expenditure level to be able to establish a true diagnosis of the implication of the military expenditure on the international economic situation. The countries of the South vainly claimed the creation of an international fund for the development supplied with the resources released, on the account of the dividends of peace. The Western countries insisted on the risk that the link disarmament-development, instead of profiting, is harmful to both. A compromise was found to recognise the crucial role of safety in the relation between the concepts of disarmament and of development, the principled mention of the reassignment of a part of the resources devoted to military ends into development targets...

The disappearance of the East/West division made it possible to pass from Arms Control to a true disarmament on bilateral (intermediate nuclear forces, 3 START) – as well as multilateral level (convention on the conventional forces in Europe, convention on the prohibition of the chemical weapons, denuclearized zones, treaty on the complete prohibition of the nuclear tests, treaty on the antipersonnel mines, etc.).

During the nineties we experienced a reduction of the world military expenditure. But the sums released weren't reallocated to the development aid. Quite opposite, this one also decreased during the decade, and in proportions, even more important than the world military expenditure.

We realised indeed that initially, disarmament costs before releasing new resources. In addition and paradoxically, the end of the ideological competition had negative effects on the public aid for the development. The developing countries did not represent any more a stake of the competition of super powers. The worry of reducing the budget deficits of the countries of North was also going to have a negative impact on the volume of the PAD.

The link disarmament-development was even reversed. The settlement of the nuclear heritage of the Soviet Union by Russia only, and the nuclear disarmament of Bielorrussia, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine were possible thanks to a financial aid.

When the Douma will ratify the treaty START II in April 2000, it will match it of a cancelling clause if events of an economic nature would come to prevent it from being able to fulfil its obligations. Article 5 # conditions the respect of the treaty by the existence of a suitable financing. The convention on the chemical weapons could be implemented only accompanied by the promise to help certain countries in their task of destruction of existing stocks.

In the same way, aids were granted in order to facilitate the reduction of the nuclear arsenals of Russia. The prohibition treaty of the antipersonnel mines can also be placed from this point of view. It was essential to provide a material aid to the countries - generally in the process of development - which were the most affected by the presence of mines on their territory. The treaty obliges the parts in the position to make it, to provide an aid to the affected countries.

The mine clearance and the destruction of stocks make it possible to return spaces to the farming, the breeding or the production. In short, one returns them to their economic vocation. So there is interaction between development and disarmament. But if the

manufacturing cost of the mines is evaluated between 3 and 30 dollars, the mine clearance costs between 300 and 1000 dollars per machine. With estimations from 60 to 80 million mines left again in the world, the global cost of the mine clearance would return between 18 and 60 billion dollars. The aid to the 300 000 victims of the mines is it evaluated to 3 billion dollars.

The end of the American budget deficits made it possible the United States to again increase their military budget at the end of the 90's and even before the election of George Bush. A form of rejection of the multilateral agreements, to the profit of unilateral practices stopped the movement towards disarmament. The cost of disarmament was even proposed by its detractors. The US General Accounting Office evaluated in 1995 the cost of the United States nuclear disarmament (dismantling, destruction, decontamination, recycling, etc.) at between 300 and 1 000 billion dollars.

But like pointed out Mr. Dhanapala, the cost of disarmament is in fact first the cost of the armament, and these weapons would not have to be destroyed if they had not been manufactured.

Moreover, the maintenance in the arsenals is not free. In the American case the maintenance of the arsenal is estimated at 25 billion dollars per annum. The maintenance of the arsenals is thus more expensive than disarmament. This started a debate on the force existing between Europe and the United States at a time when Europe accelerated the implementation of its European policy of common safety. September 11th resulted in to amplify this movement, Washington reacting by the very consequent increase of its defence budget. While at the same time one wondered about the nature of the answer to bring to the terrorist challenge and on the respective part of the military and policies means, one attended a strong growth of the military expenditure to which a comparable increase in the development aid did not correspond. The triangle safety - disarmament - development was shaken by an insistence put on the military means to obtain safety, without taking into account neither of the disarmament nor of the development. Although many persons in charge of and experts stressed that the collapsed states, the grey zones, the ethnic conflicts, the civil wars, the economic inequalities, the underdevelopment, were as many factors of insecurity which were not necessarily treated by military means, the international community did not learn the lessons in terms of development aid. One of the lessons of September 11th, 2001 is that the globalisation has a tragic face. Namely that one can organise, from far-off mountains of a poor country, a bomb attack with a great extent against a rich and powerful country. And that the fact of only taking part himself for 37% of the world military expenditure did therefore not bring safety to this country.

There is thus triple crisis, of the development aid disputed in its principle and reduced in its extent, of the disarmament which is broken down for its multilateral aspects and of safety, in major crisis.

Which are the means allowing to recreate the link between the three concepts?

- The method of the funds released by disarmament, consisting to reallocate the funds or a part of these funds, saved thanks to measurements of disarmament, to development ends;
- The method of tax perception on the armaments, within the framework of which the national contributions to the development are calculated on the basis of agreed measurement of the resources allocated by each State to military ends;
- voluntary contributions on the model of many of other funds of the United Nations and the specialised agencies, where each State fixes itself its contribution.

I - The method of the funds released by disarmament represents a traditional approach of the problem.

It has disadvantages however:

? It can be difficult to quantify with precision the economies released by the execution of an agreement of disarmament.

? Concretely an agreement of disarmament obeys requirements of safety, not economic requirements. It can even initially cause new expenditure.

The method of the released funds is so relevant if one takes into account the whole military expenditure, it is less when one considers the concrete execution of the agreements of disarmament.

II – The way of the taxation

It is a question of creating resources by the creation of a tax related to the activities of defence. The difficulties are many. It is necessary for that this type of operation is set up, that at least the richest countries accept the principle of an international taxation. One knows the debates - and impossibility of succeeding - on the "Tobbin Tax". Can one imagine that, based on which plate related to the activities of defence, the imposition will be accepted better? It risks to be more defended that one will not be subjected. The potential not-contributors will be enthusiastic, the contributors definitely less.

Let's mention some projects or proposals however.

1. To tax the sales with weapons.

The sales of weapons are often presented like strategically destabilising, economically and socially expensive for the purchasing countries.

They are generally done - but not only - in a North-South direction.

Taxation will have to thus rest on the States suppliers which are mainly the developed countries. But these one are not direct operators, most of the time the industries of armament belong to private capital. Wouldn't they be caused to consequently to reflect the cost of the imposition in the final price, in the end supporting taxation on the purchasing countries, generally not producers, therefore very often not industrialised? A country which would produce for itself on the other hand would be exempted. Also let us note that the sales of weapons represent only 7% of the world military expenditure, which limits the range of a taxation.

In fact it is not exports of weapons as such which are illegitimate, but excesses can be made. In this way they are instruments as the European code of which fixed the necessary limits between the morality and the immorality of the weapons sales.

- If restrictions must be brought to the transfers of armament, it is for other reasons that those aiming to facilitate the development: political criteria compared to repressive regimes, solvency and/or debt of the purchasing country, etc.

2. Another solution would consist in taxing not only the transfers with armament, but also the productions. This measurement would have a triple merit:

- it would encourage truly the countries to disarm;

- it would restore the reciprocity between producer countries and purchasing countries;
- in terms of development, even if this aspect should not be privileged, his financial statement would be 5 times superior with the tax only on the sales of weapons.

In this case, it is the country which would incorporate the materials in its armies in the form of national production or in the form of imports which would be submitted to the tax.

3. An alternative formula would consist in establishing a tax on the whole of the military expenditure and not only on the equipment expenditure. Here too there is a difficulty. All the budgets are not transparent. But at least, one knows in a precise way the military expenditure of the countries developed from the transparency of the budgetary procedures. The richest countries thus will be easily targeted.

4. To suggest not to tax the armament transfers but the number of nuclear warheads. This idea could profit from public support and from the support of many governments because the majority of them are at the head of governments which do not have nuclear weapons. In term of disarmament, it would have the major disadvantage to give an official character and internationally recognised to nuclear arsenals held by countries not considered, like nuclear States within the NPT. This measurement would thus not serve disarmament, on the opposite.

Moreover , any additional effort of disarmament would cause to decrease the resources basis for the development.

5. A tax on the number of soldiers:

It could be considered as hypocrite on behalf of the Western countries, since the armies of the Third World are more numerous because not professional .

The way of taxation thus seems to run up against many obstacles. The political good-will to implement it was not the least. It is obviously less ambitious, but can make it possible to expect more accessible results in short term.

III – The voluntary help

Several assumptions can be considered:

- a. Creation of development funds for disarmament. It is a question of like allowing the implementation of agreements of disarmament by exceeding possible economic obstacles what was made for the treaty on the antipersonnel mines.
- b. To implement a policy of transparency on the military expenditure.
- c. To create an observatory calculating the ratio in the developed countries, between the military expenditure and the PAD. That would constitute a psychological incentive to increase the second. It has especially the immense advantage of creating a link and a balance between military solutions and political solutions with the problems of safety. Whereas the traditional link disarmament -development can be called into question for its difficulties of practical application, this one completely seems to be appropriate for the challenges of after September 11th and the risks which generate the increase in the world military expenditure.

APPENDIX

COMPARISON OF THE WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND THE PUBLIC AID TO THE DEVELOPMENT

1992-2001
(in billion of dollars US)

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Military Expenditure	847	814	793	741	722	732	719	728	757	772
APD	67	69	71	66	64	48,3	53	56,5	53,7	51,3

Source Given PAD: The World Bank
Source given military expenditure: Sipri