Déclarations

French non-paper on Cluster munitions,
19 April 2007

 

France is highly sensitive to the humanitarian danger that the use of cluster munitions can present. Recent events, such as the conflict in Lebanon, have demonstrated the urgency of finding concrete responses to the humanitarian issues related to cluster munitions.

France is mindful of the issue of compliance with international humanitarian law with regard to the protection of civilians during armed conflict. France owns cluster munitions but has not used them since 1991, does not export them, and has extremely small stockpiles. Our use doctrine for this category of weapons provides for the strict protection of civilians under all circumstances.

Aware of the humanitarian issues related to cluster munitions, France intends to pursue its determined action to strengthen the relevant international standards, and propose points for discussion to help each State integrate the humanitarian concerns related to this type of weapon as swiftly as possible.

 

1/ We must move towards a common understanding of the concept of cluster munitions, which currently encompasses a wide variety of weapons. This would help us move swiftly towards an accepted definition, which would be a preliminary stage to the implementation of concrete measures to reduce the humanitarian consequences of the use of cluster munitions.

The definition of cluster munitions should include the technical characteristics (mechanism to limit active life, guidance system, etc.) and operational life of these weapons.

 

2/ As the law stands, the use of cluster munitions is governed by Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which prohibits superfluous injury and indiscriminate, disproportionate attacks. Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War requires the clearance of explosive remnants of war, which includes cluster munitions, after the end of active hostilities, and encourages States to take preventive steps, based on best practices, to make munitions, including cluster munitions, more reliable, in order to prevent them from becoming explosive remnants of war. France, which ratified Protocol I of 1977 in 2001, and was one of the first 25 States to ratify Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, regrets that these instruments are not universal in scope, and encourages the States who have not yet ratified them to do so without delay.

 

3/ In addition to discussion on of the application of existing international law, the specific issue of cluster munitions compels us to go further and define a new, legally binding international instrument.

 

4/ The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is the most appropriate framework for dealing with the issue of cluster munitions, because it has the capacity to include States that possess, use and/or export this type of weapon. For the greatest humanitarian effectiveness, the goal of universal scope must be emphasised. For reasons of efficiency and equality, the disparity between States must be taken into account, whether in military terms (purpose and use doctrine of cluster munitions, types and quantities of stockpiled weapons), economic or technological terms. Consideration must also be given to the security and defence obligations and concerns of the States Parties least advanced technologically or that have limited resources.

In light of the above, France hopes that the discussion mandate on cluster munitions adopted at the CCW Review Conference in November 2006 will lead to the negotiation of a legally binding international instrument on cluster munitions at the next Conference of the States Parties in November 2007. The instrument could be a Protocol VI annexed to the CCW.

France will take advantage of its participation in the seminar organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in April and at the CCW Group of Governmental Experts meeting in June to work towards swift, concrete progress. The CCW Group of Governmental Experts meeting should be an opportunity to issue recommendations in favour of the adoption of a negotiation mandate on cluster munitions in November 2007.

France took part in the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions convened on 22 and 23 February 2007. At this conference, France and 45 other States undertook to pursue the goal of a legally binding international instrument prohibiting the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. The States also agreed to meet again in Lima in May, in Vienna in November/December and in Dublin in early 2008. A regional meeting was also announced by Belgium. The "Oslo process" is not in competition with the CCW. On the contrary, the two processes should complement and mutually reinforce each other. The Oslo process has given political impetus to the CCW proceedings to help them reach their goal swiftly.

 

5/ Lastly, France wishes to propose key features of a future protocol on cluster munitions within the framework of the CCW to its partners:

  • The future instrument must conciliate humanitarian imperatives – notably the threat that some cluster munitions may represent for civilians – with military considerations, in particular the fact that many armies do not consider it viable to renounce all the types of weapons that belong to the cluster munitions category. The future instrument should introduce the principle of strict prohibition of the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or transfer of cluster munitions that – depending on the definition used – are likely to cause unacceptable harm to civilians ("prohibited" cluster munitions). The instrument should not restrict participation in operations in coalition or alliance, and should preserve States’ defence interests.
     

  • The definition of prohibited cluster munitions must take into account the inherent technical characteristics of the weapons (e.g. whether or not they have a limited active life mechanism), the number of cluster munitions they contain (i.e. set a limit below which some weapons containing cluster munitions would not be considered cluster munitions), and their operational life (i.e. set a maximum operational life above which a cluster munition would automatically be classed in the prohibited category).
     

  • The future instrument should include an obligation to destroy "prohibited" cluster munitions, while providing for an appropriate transition period and the possibility of maintaining minimal stocks for strictly defined, legal purposes for an interim period.
     

  • The future instrument should include measures based on best practices to improve the reliability, accuracy and operation of authorised cluster munitions.

  • It should also encourage cooperation and assistance between States (in particular, to destroy stockpiles, to develop techniques for the destruction, neutralisation and clearance of cluster munitions, and to train personnel in these techniques). The future instrument must be drafted as a complement to Protocol V to the CCW on Explosive Remnants of War.

  • The future instrument could include an enforcement mechanism, which should take into account appropriate transition periods for the implementation of some binding measures (such as the prohibition on the use of weapons and the obligation to destroy weapons)./.