At the outset, I would like to thank the Center for Non Proliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies and in particular Jean du Preez for having invited me to express my views on what can be done during this cycle to ensure a good preparation for the Review Conference of 2010.

But before addressing the future, I would like to look back at the past.

If you allow me and with no intention of impinging on interventions by other speakers, I would like to give my personal assessment of the 2005 Review Conference and remind the context it took place within.

Since 2000, dramatic changes of the international strategic context have arisen : 11 September attacks and their consequences; appearance of the most serious crisis of proliferation challenging the Treaty (Iran, DPRK, Libya files); discovery of a clandestine network supplying nuclear goods and technologies. All these events have deeply transformed the international security and created radically new conditions and behaviors.

The last review process had to adapt quickly to this new context and therefore constituted more a cycle of transition than the mere follow up of the previous cycle. Nevertheless, during the last cycle, substantive debates could take place, new proposals have been launched (issue of withdrawal, mechanisms for fuel supply assurances…) which remain valid and will contribute to our future discussions. Even if the Conference was not able to agree on a substantive final document, the review process was pursued and nobody opposed the centrality and the relevance of the Treaty. We were able to agree on an agenda (unfortunately too late), on a programme of work and on a procedural report which contain "acquis" that we should build upon during the next cycle. I would say that the review process resisted quite well to the "storm". Thus, 2005 has not been an insignificant step.

Therefore, 2005 is in a way something uncompleted and it is the point where we should restart from.

What are our goals for the next cycle and how to reach them ?

2/ What is the situation of the Treaty vis-à-vis the current international context ? One cannot but recognize that the non-proliferation regime is facing serious challenges.

The first challenge is non-compliance : since 2002, we had to deal with the second North-Korean crisis, the Iranian nuclear dossier and, last October, for the first time, a State Party to the Treaty conducted a nuclear test.

The second challenge is the increasing demand for energy that will require more civilian cooperations in the nuclear field, which should be proliferation-resistant.

That does not mean that we should lose sight of the objectives in disarmament as defined in article VI, nor of the 1995 principles and objectives adopted in this regard. But these objectives should be addressed bearing in mind on the one hand what has already been done and on the other hand what is realistic to try to achieve in this regard - namely the entry into force of the CTBT and the commencement of negotiations of an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament. These two objectives, while directly linked to implementation of article VI, cannot be achieved within the sole review process but in other frameworks.

3/ In my view, the main objectives of the 2007-2010 cycle are to pursue the adaptation of the regime to the new context and to restore confidence. In this regard, our aim should be to address the challenges and to strengthen the Treaty. The instrument is seriously jeopardized by the Iranian and North-Korean crisis of proliferation and it is more than necessary that States Parties express an unanimous support to the Treaty, after the strong response expressed by the international community (IAEA and Security Council) to these threats to its authority. This should not exclude discussions on all aspects of the Treaty, whose three pillars must be addressed.

To my view, procedural arrangements for 2002-2005 remain valid :

• as for the Prepcoms : general debate, discussions within clusters, specific issues, one session for NGOs, factual summary by the Chair during the 1^st and second Prepcom, consensus report if possible at the third one containing recommendations for the Review Conference and, above all, finalization of a draft agenda and programme of work for the Conference at the third or, if necessary, at the fourth Prepcom. In this respect we should have in mind that the 2005 Review Conference, which started with no agreement on an agenda or a programme of work, was seriously disadvantaged especially bearing in mind the disruptions occurred on the international scene. Then, we should avoid next time being in a situation where the Conference opens without having a provisional agenda and a programme of work for consideration.

• as for the Conference of 2010 itself, the rules of procedure adopted in 2005 constitute the best basis for our work. In particular, the rule of consensus for substantive decisions is of the essence. It’s a demanding rule, but it ensures the full adherence and support of States Parties to the orientations and views expressed by the Conference.

4/ To ensure a good preparation of the Review Conference, we should in my view :

• start working without delay on procedural arrangements for the Conference, that should be finalized in 2009, and not await until the last Prepcom to work them out. When working on the procedural issues, it would be advisable that we refer to the 2005 adopted agenda and programme of work, which contain "acquis" and elements of possible consensus that we should not lose. We should then follow a "building blocks approach", adjusting every year parts of the contents ;

• try and adopt, at the first Prepcom or the next one, a sort of "rules of the road" that would consist in a prospective document on the way to conduct discussions during the following Prepcoms and the Review Conference. The objective of these "rules" would be to ensure fair and result-oriented discussions and avoid, for example, that procedure be diverted to prevent progress on the substance. It would then allow the Prepcoms to be able to gradually identify possible areas of consensus ;

• use the 2009 Prepcom to the largest extent possible notably on procedural issues. As to the consensus report we are supposed to adopt in 2009, should we be unable to do so, the Chair could transmit to the review Conference the set of different substantive proposals with a summary of the discussions, under its responsibility.

• If necessary, convene a fourth Prepcom in 2010.

I have tried to demonstrate that to make progress during this review process, we need not recipes or procedural innovations but rather a constructive spirit, objectivity and realism. Joining in a fair manner our efforts should be our main objective.

The NPT is a fundamental and irreplaceable instrument of collective security and international stability. Our future depends on it.

Thank you.